A Jurisprudential Controversy over Law's Shared Authority? by Psarras, Haris
Haris Psarras

A Jurisprudential Controversy over Law’s Shared Authority?

The authority of law is generally understood to be the authority of a legal system. It may be quite straightforward to establish over whom the authority of a legal system is typically exercised: these are the persons whose legal rights and duties are specified and enforced by the legal system in question. A more troubling question asks who are the bearers of such authority. One may say that these are the legal officials. Other answers may be more specific. For instance, some would argue that legal authority rests with the courts of a legal system or with its supreme court; with its legislature or with both its courts and legislature. In his monograph, Shared Authority: Courts and Legislatures in Legal Theory, Dimitrios Kyritsis subscribes to this latter view.  

I. Law’s Shared Authority, Legal Positivism, and Interpretivism 
As the monograph’s title and subtitle suggest, Kyritsis’s argument defends further claims with regard to law’s authority in light of its exercise by courts and a legislature.  First, a claim about the structure of law’s authority, as this unfolds through the relationship between legislative and judicial decision-making: the book denies that law’s authority is a divided authority (that is, divided between courts and a legislature, in the sense that each has its own jurisdiction that is delineable from that of the other).​[1]​ It argues in detail in favour of the idea that it is a ‘shared authority’​[2]​ – shared between courts and a legislature, which are considered as ‘governing together’,​[3]​ through a joint project based on ‘mutual commitment and support’​[4]​ in order to promote ‘a just and well-ordered society’.​[5]​ 
	Second, the claim that legal positivism (more accurately, Raz’s approach to law’s authority understood as a theory of positivist inspiration) cannot accommodate a conceptualization and justification of law’s authority as shared authority in  the sense discussed above; moreover, that a revised version of interpretivism (committed to Dworkin’s view that ‘the content of the law is determined by the principles that offer the best interpretation of institutional history’​[6]​ and, at the same time, critical of the priority that Dworkin grants to integrity over other virtues of political institutions​[7]​) is clearly more promising in this respect. 
	The arguments in support of these two claims develop hand in hand in most chapters of the book and make an original contribution to both constitutional theory and general jurisprudence. The claims as such deserve and stimulate responses, as they are both refreshingly controversial.  
The claim that law’s authority is a shared authority may at first be perceived as more controversial than it actually is in its version defended in the monograph. The separation of powers, conceived as a long-established institutional arrangement that has also been cherished as a normative principle and a key component of the rule of law, underpins the view that law’s authority is a divided authority and has clearly contributed to its wide popularity among both theorists and practitioners. Thus, taken at face value, the claim that law’s authority is a shared authority (a claim that plainly rejects the theory of divided authority) may also be perceived as a challenge to the idea that the separation of powers has, and should be ascribed, a central role in architecting authority structures. So understood, the claim would probably encounter forceful resistance.
The monograph’s defence of the claim may reject a sharp division of labour between courts and legislatures,​[8]​ but still strongly defends the separation of powers, which it defines as ‘the value of coordinated institutional effort’​[9]​ in light of the principle of checks and balances.​[10]​ Thus, even some conceptualizations of law’s authority as a divided authority – more precisely, those of them that acknowledge a legal system’s claim to moral authority (eg a positivist conceptualization of the division of labour between legislative and adjudicative authority in terms of a division of moral labour, as I would put it) – would find common ground with Kyritsis’s moderate account of shared authority. And it is in this respect that his account, though refreshing, is not as strongly controversial as it may seem at first glance. 
Yet the other major claim defended in the monograph is, as I understand it, no less controversial than it appears to be at first sight. I find unconvincing the idea that the abandonment of positivist views of law’s authority in favour of an interpretivist approach to the matter (even if the latter comes in the monograph’s revised version of interpretivism) facilitates – let alone enables – the vindication of the model of shared authority advanced in the book.​[11]​ And this is so, even though I share Kyritsis’s doubts about the potential of Dworkin’s account of integrity (understood as a virtue of both courts and legislatures) to capture the normative requirements that legislative authority should meet in order to be genuinely binding.​[12]​
In the same vein, I do not find any more persuasive the consideration of those explanations of authority that make sense of it in terms of exclusionary reasons as inadequate to provide a normative account of law’s authority. And this is so, even though I agree that the interpretivist perspective that has inspired this problematic rejection could perhaps be more promising with regard to other philosophical questions about law (eg questions about legal interpretation) if defended on the basis of the value of legality in light of the separation of powers,​[13]​ as the monograph proposes, rather than in light of Dworkinian integrity alone. 
On closer inspection, I would say that my objection to the claim that an interpretivist account of law’s authority is superior to its positivist-inspired counterparts, in that it allegedly portrays the relationship between courts and a legislature more faithfully and holds the relevant legitimacy considerations in higher regard, emerges, not although, but because I find convincing Kyritsis’s doubts about integrity as well as his advocacy of legality mainly in terms of the separation of powers.
In fact, although the monograph openly distances itself from Dworkin’s theory only when it comes to the justificatory potential of integrity and the meaning of legality, this distancing reveals further tensions between the monograph’s broader claims and arguments and those of Dworkin; tensions that, as I understand them, are due to the fact that Kyritsis’s interpretivist approach does not disengage itself from what it criticizes as a positivist legacy on law’s authority adequately enough to persuade us that its self-portrayal as an interpretivist (thus, non-positivist) approach is apposite. If so, then the monograph’s claim that a promising consideration of law’s authority as a shared authority presupposes an interpretivist approach to law’s authority does not succeed. And this is because the monograph’s version of law’s shared authority appears promising without having properly established its superiority over positivist-inspired views and without being genuinely interpretivist itself – or so I will argue. 
In the rest of this commentary, I will explain why I find this claim unsuccessful or, considering that Kyritsis has kindly agreed to provide responses to the comments discussed in this symposium, why I would like to hear more from him on this matter. The monograph’s argument in support of this claim has two limbs. One is negative, in the sense that it purports to demonstrate that positivist theories on law’s authority fail to make sense of the joint project of government through which courts and a legislature are considered to practise their shared authority.​[14]​  Also, the negative argument includes some of the rebuttals of positivist critiques of Dworkin’s interpretivism. The positive argument defends Kyritsis’s account of shared authority from what is taken to be an interpretivist perspective. More about the positive argument will be said in section III, after evaluating the core of the negative argument in section II.  

II. Law’s Shared Authority and Positivist-Inspired Theories of Law’s Authority
Part of the reason why the negative argument attracts objections is that it is not always clear what the precise target of its criticism is; or perhaps that the target slightly changes as we move from the critique of positivist-inspired theories of law’s authority in chapter 2 to the critique of positivist objections to interpretivism in chapter 3. One way to dispose of this perplexity is to argue that the target of the former critique is Raz’s theory of law’s authority understood as the crystallization of the views on authority generally held by positivists, while the target of the latter critique is a set of positivist arguments mounted against interpretivism understood as a self-standing and comprehensive theory on the grounds of law that offers itself as a substitute for positivism. 
	Yet this reading of the negative argument is not without problems. First, it raises a further question: why should positivism’s inquiry, which is an inquiry into the grounds of law from the perspective of legal validity alone, be considered as inevitably related to (and responsible for any weaknesses of) a theory on law’s authority? The fact that the theory on law’s authority in question endorses positivism, as a theory on legal validity, does not entail that it considers the nature and legitimacy of authority as a matter of legal validity. Quite to the contrary, defenders of the so-called Razian theory of authority distinguish between the two issues.​[15]​ Interpretivism’s view of the two as inevitably interconnected can hardly provide a reliable basis for arguments against positivist-inspired theories on law’s authority and in favour of their interpretivist counterparts. The reliability of such a basis for arguments in favour of interpretivism is evidently undermined by the fact that the interpretivist perspective is silently taken on board before its evaluation in comparison with positivism even begins.
	Second, the consideration of the negative argument as mounted against two distinct – despite their allegedly inevitable interrelation – targets, is at odds with the author’s statement that even his ‘argument against the Razian account’ of authority, as such, aims to cast ‘doubt over the entire legal positivist edifice.’​[16]​ Here, the fusion of the two targets is arguably clearer than in any other line in the monograph. But it is also highly questionable. The monograph’s readers are invited to consider legal positivism as premised upon Raz’s theory of authority. Otherwise, arguments against the latter would not – on their own – amount to arguments against the former.
Note, though, that positivism, as discussed here, is, in essence, the sources thesis (the thesis that all law is source-based). And, interestingly, the relationship between Raz’s account of authority and the sources thesis is just the other way round: it is not the thesis that argues in favour of the account; rather, it is the account that is intended to perform – surely, among other (explanatory and justificatory) functions – the role of ‘creat[ing] a weighty argument in favour of the sources thesis’.​[17]​ Hence, contrary to what is sometimes implied and at other times openly claimed in the monograph, any objections against the account, even if valid, would not necessarily undermine the thesis. And, although it is conceded in the monograph that it cannot be excluded that ‘a different version of legal positivism will do a better job’ than Raz’s account, it is remarked, straight after the concession, that this will be ‘a tall order’ for any positivist-inspired approach.​[18]​
	Further remarks incorporated in the negative argument generate further objections. The complaint against Raz’s account (and positivist-inspired theories of authority, more broadly) is that it does not leave room for the key role that jurisdictional considerations play in the judicial determination of the authority of a legislature in legal systems with ‘a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review’.​[19]​ Raz’s theory is criticized for being unable to account for limits set by the courts to the exercise of the legislature’s authority beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.
	The charge is serious. Yet it cannot stand against Raz’s account, except on the basis of a misreading of one of its claims. The misreading in question, which is indeed detectable in the monograph’s argument, consists in the consideration of Raz’s claim that legal systems, unlike other normative systems, ‘do not acknowledge any limitation of the spheres of behaviour which they claim authority to regulate’​[20]​ as suggesting that the authority of legal authorities (and more precisely, for the purpose of the monograph’s argument, of a legislature) is unlimited.
	The misreading is dispelled, if one acknowledges that the authority of a legal system is one thing, and the authority of such a system’s different legal authorities (that is, of its separate legal institutions)​[21]​ is another. The fact that the authority of a legal system cannot be manifested in practice except through the exercise of decision-making authority by one of its institutions does not mean that the two cannot be distinguished from each other in conceptual terms. To simplify, the authority of a legal system can be conceived of as the aggregation of the portions of limited authority of each of its authorities (qua institutions).
Considering this distinction between law’s authority and legal authorities, it becomes clear that Raz’s account – which acknowledges and has elaborated upon it – can accommodate jurisdictional considerations: the authority of a legal system knows no limitation in the sense that, given legal systems’ de facto authority, legal directives can be issued and coercion can be exercised over persons with regard to any activity; but the authority of each of a legal system’s authorities is limited – its limits are set by rules and other ‘factors which determine [the authorities’] jurisdiction’.​[22]​
The aforementioned extracts from Raz’s works that indicate his theory’s ability to account for jurisdictional considerations, are included in the monograph’s chapter on Kyritsis’s complaint against it (ch 2); but the distinction between law’s unlimited authority and the legal authorities’ jurisdiction that underlies them, is not discussed there. However, the distinction is briefly acknowledged in another chapter (ch 5).​[23]​ In that chapter, Raz’s account is criticized for also failing to capture ‘the relationship between citizens and institutions,’​[24]​ through favouring an ‘insulat[ion of] the official world from civil society’ that is  inadequate to explain ‘the power that citizens have in some … legal systems to mount a constitutional challenge to a piece of legislation before a court.’​[25]​ Though acknowledged, the distinction is quickly and rather opaquely rejected for ‘leav[ing] room for fussiness and thus vitiat[ing] Raz’s insulation strategy.’​[26]​
The basis of the argument against what is considered as ‘Raz’s insulation strategy’ is, again, the complaint discussed earlier in this review: the claim that Raz’s theory cannot account for the notion of jurisdiction. But this time, the complaint is defended by a reference to a specific type of constitutional challenge to legislation. One of the possible objections to this defence offers an opportunity to reaffirm the accommodation of jurisdictional considerations by Raz’s theory; not through appealing again to the distinction between law’s authority and legal authorities, but through a different route. This suggests that the distinction itself (valid in its own right, as demonstrated above) is not the only line of defence of the place reserved for the notion of jurisdiction in Raz’s account.
The type of constitutional challenge discussed in that part of the monograph is that occurring in ‘federalism cases … when a court polices the division of labour between the federal legislature and the state’.​[27]​ Raz’s theory is found to fail to aptly explain cases in which ‘citizens … argue that the federal legislature has regulated a matter … that falls within the jurisdiction of states’.​[28]​ The reason why it allegedly fails in this explanatory task is that what is contested in this type of challenge is ‘the vires of the federal legislature’, a matter foreign to Raz’s account; foreign, the argument continues, because the account, due to its commitment to the insulation of reasons for the evaluation of authoritative directives from citizens’ access, can make sense of  challenges only in terms of ‘the merits of [each challenged] … decision’​[29]​, that is, not also ‘in terms of the jurisdiction of the respective authorities’,​[30]​ as is the case in the type of challenge at hand. 
What is special about such constitutional challenges? A citizen asks a court to check a legislature’s directive not in terms of the quality of the balance struck among the reasons that underlie it (the dependent reasons), but in terms of the respect that the legislature in question (the federal legislature) should demonstrate towards the sphere of legislative decision-making of another institution (the state) in the same legal system. In other words, such challenges involve considerations not only about the relation between courts and a legislature, but also about inter-institutional relations within the realm of legislative authority. 
Raz’s theory would be bound to fail to acknowledge the jurisdictional dimension of the inter-institutional relations that unfold within the legislative sphere, if it considered all inter-institutional relations as authority relations (this is because it is the theory’s account of authority relations alone that is criticized for neglecting jurisdictional considerations). But Raz’s theory expressly denies that all relations among institutions are authority relations.​[31]​ It also considers as authority relations only those inter-institutional relations in which an institution may see its tasks discharged by another institution in the name of a better balance of dependent reasons.​[32]​ From these two remarks taken together, it follows that, according to Raz’s theory, in inter-institutional relations that are not authority relations, each institution’s tasks are reserved solely for the institution that has them. And it is the theory’s acknowledgement of these very relations that indicates that the notion of jurisdiction is not foreign to it.

III Law’s Shared Authority and Interpretivism
I now turn to a critique of the monograph’s positive argument. The argument is complex in that it includes a number of claims. All of them, though, are joined together by a common purpose: to establish that an account of law’s authority as a joint project of governing undertaken by courts and a legislature is plausible and can be better defended from an interpretivist perspective on law; more precisely, from a revised interpretivist approach which introduces itself, in the monograph, as differing from Dworkin’s interpretivism in terms of the fact that it rejects his integrity-based and court-centric conception of legality.​[33]​ My critique is addressed to one part of the positive argument. In brief, as said in section I, it challenges the claim that the said approach is genuinely interpretivist.
	The positive argument is developed primarily in chapter 4, while some of its tenets are discussed in chapter 3 and others are taken further in chapter 5. A peripheral part of the negative argument that also appears in chapter 3 (namely, the rebuttals of some of the positivist critiques to interpretivism explored in the monograph)​[34]​ paves the way to the defence of the revised interpretivist approach and is, therefore, a good starting point for a critique to it. 
The two positivist critiques that are of more interest to us here​[35]​ culminate, respectively, in the objection that interpretivism does not impose a genuine constraint on law’s interpretation (labelled in the monograph as the no-constraint objection)​[36]​; and in the claim that interpretivism actually presupposes legal positivism, despite its self-portrayal as an alternative theory on the nature of law (let us call it the no-alternative claim).​[37]​ The rebuttal of both is crucial to the success of the monograph’s interpretivist approach to law’s authority.
More precisely, this goes as follows. The rebuttal of the no-constraint objection is crucial to the success of the interpretivist theory of law’s authority as shared authority between courts and a legislature. This is because if such a theory allows for no constraints on the interpretation of the law (which is, of course, the courts’ task), then it allows for no significant ‘share’ of law’s authority to be assigned to the legislature. Now, the rebuttal of the no-alternative claim is crucial to the success of the interpretivist theory of law’s authority as a non-positivist theory. If interpretivism presupposes legal positivism, then the monograph’s claim that, for an understanding of law’s authority as shared authority to fully succeed, an interpretivist perspective on law has to be adopted in place of its positivist-inspired counterpart does not obtain.
For the part of the monograph’s positive argument that I am targeting here, namely, for the defence of the almost inescapably interpretivist character of a (fully developed, at least) theory of shared authority, it is the rejection of the no-alternative claim that primarily matters. Yet, in the monograph’s rebuttal of positivist critiques, it is the response to the no-constraint objection that dominates the stage.​[38]​ A rejection of the no-alternative claim is provided in detail only in the form of counterarguments against ‘positivist comebacks’​[39]​ on the matter, that is, against positivist arguments targeting interpretivism ‘even in its revised form defended’​[40]​ in the monograph. 
Contrary to what the last quote implies, the monograph’s revised interpretivism turns out to be more exposed to the critique underlying the no-alternative claim than Dworkin’s interpretivism. In this sense, the argument in favour of the interpretivist character of the monograph’s theory of shared authority does not hit its target. In fact, the monograph’s revised interpretivism makes too many concessions to positivist considerations to be able to celebrate the title of a genuinely interpretivist theory that it claims for itself.  
The reason for that is that the revisions to Dworkin’s interpretivism undertaken by the monograph are not only about what was highlighted earlier as the adoption of the principle of separation of powers in lieu of integrity. They are also about the degree of consistency of court decisions with legislature decisions that interpretivism should account for and embrace. Law, according to interpretivism, is a matter of the rights and duties that flow from that interpretation of a political community’s legal practice​[41]​ that best fits and justifies it.​[42]​ Now, the revisionist aspirations of the monograph’s interpretivism are not just about the dimension of justification (as its complaint about integrity’s narrow justificatory potential may suggest at first glance), but also about the dimension of fit. 
In the monograph’s revised interpretivism, the dimension of fit (which is the one that the no-alternative claim could more comfortably appeal to, to defend an intersection between interpretivism and positivism) appears to be in better tune with positivist considerations than in Dworkin’s interpretivism. To consider why, note, first, that interpretation, in interpretivism, is judges’​[43]​ (courts’, in the monograph) business, while the legal practice that interpretation has to fit and justify consists of the community’s political decisions,​[44]​ the largest part of which are laws passed by lawmakers​[45]​ (that is, legislature’s decisions, in the monograph’s terms).
If one compares the courts’ handling of the legislature’s decisions advocated by Dworkin’s interpretivism with that advocated by the revised version, the positivist underpinnings of the latter become evident. In Dworkin’s account, the said decisions do not impose legal duties on citizens just by themselves; they simply ‘purport to impose’​[46]​ such duties. These purported duties are considered as the products of a pre-interpretive decision-making practice that can generate legal duties only after (and in virtue of) its ‘main elements’​[47]​ (not even all of them) have been interpreted by the courts in light of the values that best justify it. This is why Dworkin’s interpretivism appears to have a strong case to present itself as a theory on the nature of law that abandons positivism: in interpretivism, the legal status of legal duties (and rights) is a matter not of them being created through authoritative decision-making, but of them eventually emerging through a value-driven interpretation of authoritative decisions (an interpretation in light of justice, fairness, and procedural due process​[48]​).
By way of contrast, in the monograph’s version, ‘courts … ought to decide cases according to the law’,​[49]​ and ‘judges owe [respect] to legislative decisions’​[50]​ and violate an aspect of their duty if their decisions are ‘not consistent with the law, even if [they are] superior along some other dimension.’​[51]​ In other words, a contemplated decision’s superiority in terms of any of the aforementioned values that drive interpretation in Dworkin’s interpretivism does not suffice to justify a certain distancing of a judge from the legislature’s decisions. This model of the courts’ engagement with legislative decisions is not at odds with routine judicial practice, but it can hardly be characterized as genuinely interpretivist. This is because it takes legislative decisions to owe their binding legal status to their provenance from legislature’s authority and to have such a status even before (or even despite) their potential interpretation in light of any values. 
To be fair, the requirement, in the monograph, that a judge has such a duty (a duty of acting consistent with legislative decisions) only to the extent that she ‘finds some good reason for the assignment of a certain power to the legislature’,​[52]​ allows the monograph’s scenario to evaluate legislative action and address the problem of its legitimacy​[53]​ (with legitimacy being understood as a matter of a reason-based sharing of decision-making power between courts and the legislature). Yet it does not render the monograph’s version of interpretivisim any more genuine in interpretivist terms. This is because the good reason in question is, according to the monograph, a matter of ‘considerations of institutional design’​[54]​ (that is, considerations of separation and modest sharing of powers), not one of moral values. In any event, individual legislative decisions do not need to undergo substantial interpretation to be found consistent or inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers. Cases of judicial review may indeed count as an exception here. However, despite their importance, they do not appear to cover a sufficiently large proportion of all legal cases for a theory on their adjudication to count as a revised interpretivist theory on the nature of law.  

IV A Concluding Remark













^1	  Dimitrios Kyritsis, Shared Authority: Courts and Legislatures in Legal Theory, (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015) 41–43.
^2	  ibid 7–18.
^3	  ibid 117–20.
^4	  ibid 119.
^5	  ibid 155.  
^6	  ibid 11. 
^7	  ibid 103–4.
^8	  ibid 102.
^9	  ibid 155.
^10	  ibid 106, 109.
^11	  ibid 7.
^12	  ibid 99–103.
^13	  ibid 110–6.
^14	  ibid, ch 2 and ch 5.
^15	  This is acknowledged in the monograph, but is discussed only briefly. See eg Kyritsis, Shared Authority (n 1) 51–2, 65.
^16	  ibid 26. 
^17	  J Raz, ‘Authority, Law, and Morality’ in J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) 215.
^18	  Kyritsis, Shared Authority (n 1) 26.
^19	  ibid 32.
^20	  J Raz, ‘The Institutional Nature of Law’ in J Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979) 117; also quoted in Kyritsis, Shared Authority (n 1) 32.
^21	  J Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (n 18) 215.
^22	  J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986) 62; also quoted in Kyritsis, Shared Authority (n 1) 31.
^23	  Kyritsis, Shared Authority (n 1) 149.
^24	  ibid 138.
^25	  ibid 132. 
^26	  ibid 149.
^27	  ibid 148. 
^28	  ibid 148–9.
^29	  ibid 149.
^30	  ibid 148.
^31	  J Raz, ‘Comments and Responses’ in LH Meyer et al (eds), Rights, Culture, and the Law: Themes from the Legal and Political Philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 262.
^32	  ibid.
^33	  Kyritsis, Shared Authority (n 1) 104. 
^34	  ibid 63–71; 
^35	  For further positivist critiques, see ibid 80–91.
^36	  ibid 64.
^37	  ibid 65.
^38	  ibid 65–80.
^39	  ibid 80.
^40	  ibid (emphasis added).
^41	  R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford, Hart, 1998) 225.
^42	  ibid 66–7.
^43	  ibid 225–7.
^44	  ibid 191.
^45	  ibid 176.
^46	  ibid 191. 
^47	  ibid 66.
^48	  ibid 225.
^49	  Kyritsis, Shared Authority (n 1) 56.
^50	  ibid 94.
^51	  ibid 56.
^52	  ibid 73. 
^53	  ibid 102.
^54	  ibid 73.
